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Abstract
This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold
context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral
bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We
conclude that, for the spouse who takes the second decision, a greater
discount factor increases the set of possible sustainable agreements, as
well as the proportion of time that this agent devotes to a family good.
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Introduction
The theoretical study of family decision-making, and its relationship with
consumption and labor supply, has produced a signicant body of literature.
Some of this work takes as reference the theory of bilateral bargaining, in
which it is recognized that families are composed of individuals with sepa-
rate preferences and objectives. This literature has focused on the household
allocation problem in a static setting, in which the results of the bargaining
depend on the threat point that is xed, that is to say, the status quo.
Family bargaining models have mainly identied this threat point with di-
vorce (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981). In this case, it
is assumed that the agents can communicate freely and that the fulllment of
agreements is guaranteed by an external contract or institution. Nevertheless,
divorce does not necessarily constitute the only possible threat point in a bar-
gaining process. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Chen and Woolley (2001)
consider a non-cooperative equilibrium, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In
this situation, the repeated interaction between agents over time can tacitly
lead to cooperative results. More specically, and in accordance with the folk
theorem, a cooperative solution and, therefore, a Pareto-e¢ cient solution, can
be derived as a Nash equilibrium in a repeated game, always provided that
there is some strategy which penalizes all deviations from the cooperative
solution.
However, two questions arise in the intrahousehold bargaining framework.
How do individuals arrive at an agreement about independent actions, and
how are these agreements monitored and enforced? Households endure for
more than a single period, and the multi-period aspect of the game can poten-
tially substantially a¤ect the solution. Thus, it is necessary to view bargaining
in a multi-period setting, and to assume that the household decision-making
process is a repeated game.
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The multi-period analysis only makes sense when we assume that house-
holds are formed by individuals with separate preferences and objectives, who
are involved in long-term relationships. Recent work on bargaining models of
family decision-making has extended the one-period approach to a dynamic
setting, focusing on the study of the implications of a couples inability to
make binding, legally-enforceable commitments about future behaviour.1 A
consumption-smoothing problem arises in that setting, which produces the
inability of spouses to engage in intertemporal agreements, and that can lead
to an ine¢ cient allocation of household resources. The problem here is that
a credible promise to compensate public good production with consumption
in the future cannot be made, and this reduces incentives to specialize in
such production. Even when the analysis focuses on the e¤ect the bargaining
power, dened as the amount of money a person earns relative to the part-
ners income, has on the possibility of implementing e¢ cient outcomes at the
household level, the question of making punishment credible has also been
limited to the consumption-smoothing problem (see Rainer, 2008).
An alternative dynamic approach, focused on accommodating forward-
looking agents in a dynamic environment, has been developed by Andaluz
and Molina (2007). They use a repeated non-cooperative game in which
both members of a family can contribute voluntarily to the provision of a
family public good, and in which the maintenance of cooperative behavior
in repeated games requires the threat of punishment through the return to
the non-cooperative solution, thus guaranteeing the sustainability of solutions
that are more e¢ cient than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In this setting,
their main nding is that the spouse with the greater bargaining power has a
greater incentive to reach an agreement, and that neither of the agents have
incentives to deviate from the bargaining solution.
Both the one-period approach and the multi-period non-unitary analysis
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predict that womens share of home time decreases. In the rst case, this is
due to an increase in female human capital, whereas in the second case it is
due to the impossibility of making agreements in a dynamic setting. However,
empirical evidence seems to contradict this implication. At the longitudinal
level, Aguiar and Hurst (2007) show that, despite the increase in female labor
force participation, specialization within the household has remained rela-
tively unchanged. At the cross-sectional level, Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
use PSID data to show certain evidence pointing to the fact that, when a wife
works more hours than her husband outside the home, she still undertakes a
larger share of housework. Thus, it appears that womens share of home time
does not decrease, despite increases in womens relative earnings.
Our paper contributes to the dynamic aspects of partner relationship lit-
erature, by analysing the inuence of the valuation of the current situation
on both the time that each individual devotes to the provision of a family
good, and the gains of well-being derived from cooperation. We extend the
analysis of the dynamic aspects of the family bargaining process, developing
a supergame in which the status quo is not only dened as non-cooperative,
but also as sequential. The timing of the game is such that, at every period,
the spouses take their decisions sequentially (the Stackelberg equilibrium).
The developed model explains situations in which one of the spouses takes a
decision, knowing the choice already taken by the other. Then, we address
the question of how a household may succeed in using its resources e¢ ciently
through informal agreements, enforced through repeated interaction to deter-
mine the contribution to the provision of a family good whose consumption
is non-rival. To the best of our knowledge, this approach has not previously
been considered in the literature of family bargaining.2
As regards the main results, a greater discount factor implies an increase
in the set of sustainable agreements derived from the bargaining, as well as an
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increase in the proportion of time devoted to the family good, for the spouse
who decides second. These ndings, which seem to contradict the one-period
non-unitary household approach, conrm previous empirical analysis, in the
sense that, if the woman decides second, then her contribution to housework
may increase, despite the absence of di¤erences in the opportunity cost of
work for both spouses.
I Framework
Our approach captures an environment in which marital partners have sepa-
rate preferences and objectives, and are involved in a long-term relationship.
We develop an innitely repeated game, in which the two members of a family,
spouse 1 and spouse 2, may contribute voluntarily to the provision of a fam-
ily good whose consumption is non-rival. We suppose that the agents do not
know the moment of the dissolution of the marriage, and that the objective
of each is to maximize the discounted value of their current utilities:
1X
t=1
t 1uj(xj ; Q); (j = 1; 2)
where  2 [0; 1] denotes the discount factor, common to both agents, xj
indicates the private consumption of agent j; j = 1; 2; Q represents the family
good, Q = q1+ q2; with qj being the proportion of hours that agent j devotes
to the provision of this good.
The family good, Q, can include any situation which requires the joint
performance of the spouses, e.g., the quality of the children or the maintenance
of the home. We assume that the provision of the family good cannot be
obtained in the market, that is to say, there are no private substitutes for the
family good. Therefore, our model is not applicable to situations where family
goods are purchased in the market and shared at home. This assumption is
reasonable if we assume that, in certain cases, the private provision of family
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goods can produce losses of utility to couples, with the study of the trade-o¤
between the time devoted to family goods, and the time devoted to the labour
market, being necessary.
We suppose that the utility of each agent takes the following functional
form (see Konrad and Lommerud, 2000):
u1 = x1 +Q  q1 ;u2 = x2 +Q  q2 (1)
where x1 = w1(1 q1) and x2 = w2(1 q2), wj 2 [0; 1] represents the wage
rate for agent j and the maximum time available for each spouse is normalized
to one.
We assume that the contribution to the family good not only reduces the
time available to the labor market, but also has a psychological cost, rep-
resented by an increasing and convex function in each of these arguments
q1 ; q

2

, being ;  > 1. In line with Konrad and Lommerud (2000), we
suppose that individuals increasingly dislike spending more time on the pro-
duction of the family good.
To address the issue of how the bargaining process works over a number
of periods, we rst solve the one-shot game, a Stackelberg game, and we then
use this as the state game of an innitely repeated game, using reversion to
this non-cooperative Stackelberg equilibrium as the punishment for deviators.
We then determine the optimum levels of consumption and contribution to
the family good among the multiple stationary paths, using the symmetric
Nash bargaining solution.
II The one-shot game
As we have mentioned above, in each period t, the non-cooperative equilib-
rium is the outcome of a Stackelberg game, in which the leader (spouse 1)
commits to a certain quantity of provision of family good, while anticipating
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the optimal contribution of the follower (spouse 2).
As an example of a Stackelberg game, we can consider a situation in
which the household division of labor may be a¤ected by social norms, which
are to a large extent enforced through non-market interactions.3 In a less
egalitarian social norms framework, the prescription that women should do
the work at home may produce an alteration in the decision-making process.4
As the consumption of the family good is non-rival, following Buchholz et al.
(1997), its voluntary provision may be the result of a Stackelberg game, given
that one agent can make a credible commitment that she/he will be able to
contribute no more than a possibly very small amount of household good.
Thus, one spouse becomes a Stackelberg leader, and will take the reactions of
the follower into account when deciding the contribution to the family good.
Applying the backward induction procedure, we begin by obtaining the
equilibrium corresponding to spouse 2 (the follower). Formally:
Max
x2;q2
u2 = x2 +Q  q2
s:to x2 = w2(1  q2)
q1 = q1
(2)
From here, we deduce the levels of consumption and the provision of the
family good:
q2 =

1  w2

1= 1
;x2 = w2
"
1 

1  w2

1= 1#
(3)
and the utility level:
ud2 = w2 + q1 + (  1)

1  w2

 
 1
(4)
For spouse 1 (the leader) we formulate the following maximization prob-
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lem:
Max
x1;q1
u1 = x1 +Q  q1
s:to x1 = w1(1  q1)
q2 = q

2
(5)
and we obtain the level of private consumption, and the provision of the
household good made by spouse 1:
q1 =

1  w1

1= 1
; x1 = w1
"
1 

1  w1

1= 1#
(6)
Therefore, the levels of utility in the non-cooperative solution for both
spouses are:
u1(q

1; q

2) = w1 + (   1)

1  w1

= 1
+

1  w2

1= 1
(7)
u2(q

1; q

2) = w2 + (  1)

1  w2

= 1
+

1  w1

1= 1
(8)
In addition to the solution obtained in (3) and (6), which is an interior
solution, it is possible to analyse the situations in which one of the spouses
is the contributor to the family good (see Bucholz et al., 1997).5 We can
distinguish the following types of Stackelberg equilibria:
Case 1 The leader is the only contributor.
In this case, Q, the family good, is only supplied by spouse 1, from (5) and
with q2 = 0; we can obtain the total family good:
Q=

1 w1

 1
 1
:
and the levels of utility of both spouses:
u1( Q;0) =w1 + (   1)

1 w1

= 1
;u2( Q; 0) =w2+

1 w1

1= 1
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Case 2 The follower is the only contributor.
From the maximization problem of spouse 2, (2), and with q1 = 0; we may
determine the levels of provision of family good which are only provided by
spouse 2:eQ=  1 w2  1 1 :
with the levels of utility for both spouses in this case being:
eu1(0; eQ) =w1+  1 w2  1 1 ;eu2(0; eQ) =w2 + (  1)  1 w2 = 1
It is straightforward to deduce that ui (q

1; q

2) > ui(
Q; 0), and that
ui (q

1; q

2) > eui(0; eQ); 8 0 < wi < 1; (; ) > 1; (i = 1; 2): Thus, under
the structure of preferences dened above, for all values of the parameters,
the interior solution constitutes a dominant strategy for both agents in the
the Stackelberg equilibrium.6 This is a reasonable result, since we do not
consider the possibility that one spouse compensates the other.
In Figure 1, we represent the curves of indi¤erence of the spouses in the
non-cooperative solution. For spouse 1, the slope of the curve of indi¤erence
in the non-cooperative equilibrium is zero in (q1; q2); and is increasing and
convex if q1 > q1 and q2 > q2;
dq2
dq1

u1
> 0, d
2q2
dq21

u1
> 0.
Analogously, for spouse 2, the slope of the curve of indi¤erence that con-
tains the solution of the one shot game is equal to minus innity in the com-
bination (q1; q2), and is increasing and concave when q1 > q1 and q2 > q2;
dq2
dq1

u2
> 0; d
2q2
dq21

u2
< 0:
This situation is clearly ine¢ cient. As Kapteyn and Kooreman (1990)
show, all the points located inside the area formed by both curves of indif-
ference are Pareto superior to the equilibrium of the one shot game. They
graphically represent several allocations that have been used in the literature.
For our purpose, we focus on those points located in the contract curve CC
which are e¢ cient solutions, since, when the decisions are taken in a multi-
period framework, the loss from non-cooperation accumulates, and there ap-
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pear strong incentives to reach a Pareto Superior agreement.
However, repetition alone is not enough to eliminate the non-cooperative
static equilibria. The one-shot Stackelberg equilibrium is another possible
outcome of the repeated game. Therefore, it is necessary that both spouses
can implicitly create a strategy that deters deviations from a cooperative
solution, and reaches a combination that is Pareto superior to the one-shot
non-cooperative equilibrium.
We adopt the so-called trigger strategy (Friedman, 1971), so that, when
there is a deviation from the cooperative solution, the levels of private con-
sumption and the provision of the family good revert to those of non-cooperative
equilibrium. The threat of retaliation, through reversion to this punishment
path, is credible, since it is not in the best interest of either agent to devi-
ate unilaterally from this non-cooperative equilibrium, and it sustains Pareto
Superior outcomes.
For the sake of simplicity, we only consider the case of stationary paths for
all t. Obviously, we have not included all the factors that a¤ect cooperation
in a family framework, but we have included certain relevant factors, which
have not previously been used in the family bargaining literature.
A stationary path is sustainable in a subgame perfect equilibrium, if it
satises the following conditions:
ui(xi; Q)  ui  0; i = 1; 2 (9)
u2(x2; Q)
1    u
d
2(q1) +
u2
1   (10)
Condition (9) establishes that both spouses have incentives to cooperate,
since the well-being these agents obtain in the cooperative solution is greater
than or equal to the well-being obtained in the non-cooperative solution. Con-
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dition (10) determines that the spouse who decides second has no incentive
to deviate from the e¢ cient solution. However, the follower, given q1; could
react by deviation to maximize his/her own utility. In order to tackle this
problem, it is necessary to introduce inequality (10), which states that the
discounted value of the well-being of the follower, conforming to the speci-
ed path, the left-hand side of the inequality, is greater than the well-being
from the optimal one-shot deviation and then reversion from the following
period onwards to the punishment path, the right-hand side of the inequality.
In this setting, since the one-shot game is sequential, the leaders discount
rate plays no role. If spouse 1 deviates from a cooperative agreement, this is
immediately observed by spouse 2, thus eliminating any possible short-term
well-being gains for spouse 1. Therefore, the maintenance of the cooperative
equilibrium depends on the agent who decides second.7
Unless  is very high, constraint (10) is always binding in equilibrium,
whereas (9) is not. Denote e the minimum value of discount factor for which
(10) is not binding, and let the function g = g(q1; q2; )represent the long-term
gain from the followers cooperation. Formally:
g(q1; q2; ) = (1 w2)q2   q2 + q1   (  1)

1  w2

 
 1
  

1  w1

 1
 1
(11)
From (11), we deduce that the set of Pareto-superior solutions to the
equilibrium of the one-shot game, sustainable by way of the repeated inter-
action, is greater when the discount factor is higher. We observe that when
q1 > q

1 and q2 > q

2, the function g is increasing and concave, with the value
of its slope being minus innity in the non-cooperative solution (q1; q2) and
increasing in .
As shown in Figure 1, among the Pareto-superior combinations (q1; q2),
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we can identify a subset of sustainable solutions which can be achieved by way
of repeated interaction. In particular, all the combinations of (q1; q2) located
to the right of the broken line.
Figure 1. Set of Pareto-Superior Solutions.
(Figure 1 here)
III Bargaining solution
We address the question of how a household may succeed in using its re-
sources e¢ ciently in a self-enforcing manner, that is to say, through informal
agreements, enforced through repeated interaction. In order to determine an
equilibrium among the multiple stationary paths, it is necessary to specify
how the levels of consumption and contribution to the family good are chosen
among all possible solutions. Focusing on the study of sustainable solutions,
we suppose that there exists a bargaining process, not modeled explicitly here
and, as a result, both spouses take their decisions by way of the symmetric
Nash bargaining solution.8 That is to say, they choose the stationary paths of
private consumption and family good provision that maximize the product of
the utilities, after being normalized by the utility levels of the non-cooperative
solution, and within the set of sustainable equilibria. Formally, the problem
becomes, for  < e :
Max
x1;x2;q1;q2
J(x1; x2; q1; q2) = (u1   u1)(u2   u2)
s:to g(q1; q2; ) = 0
(12)
When  takes value zero, the non-cooperative solution satises restrictions
(9) and (10). Alternatively, if this factor takes value one, all the Pareto-
superior solutions are indeed sustainable and, consequently, the bargaining
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agreement constitutes an e¢ cient solution. Between these two extremes, the
solution of the previous problem depends on the discount factor through con-
straint g(q1; q2; ) = 0; in the above maximization problem.9 In fact, the
bargaining solution is determined by way of the tangency between an Iso-J
line and an Iso-g line, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Set of possible sustainable bargaining solutions
(Figure 2 here)
Under some regularity assumptions (see Appendix) we obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 1
For  < e :
The contribution to the family good of the spouse who decides second (fol-
lower) is increasing with respect to the discount factor: dq2d > 0:
The inuence of the discount factor on the contribution to the family good
of the spouse who decides rst (leader) is ambiguous: dq1d 7 0:
Proof.(See appendix).
From this result, it is possible to deduce that the agent who decides sec-
ond, will devote more time to the provision of the family good when the
discount factor is greater. However, the path of the contribution to the fam-
ily good made by the spouse who decides rst can be increased or decreased,
depending on the discount factor. An increasing evolution implies that the
di¤erence between the hours that this agent devotes to the family good in
the cooperative solution, and the hours determined in the non-cooperative
equilibrium, is not very signicant.
When the discount factor is greater, cooperation is more easily sustained,
leading to a higher provision of the family good by the follower. Note that we
have found that the discount factor can increase the provision of the family
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good without imposing any restriction on the followers relative earnings, or
on the psychological cost produced by devoting time to the family good. Thus,
if the woman is the follower, the higher the discount factor, the higher the
provision of the family good, even when the opportunity cost of work is the
same for both spouses.
For the leader, spouse 1, there exists a level of provision of the household
good, q^1; with q^1 > q1; which represents the minimum value from which
the relationship between the discount factor and the level of provision of the
family good made by this agent becomes negative. By contrast, for q1 < q1 bq1; when the discount factor increases, the provision of the family good by the
leader increases. There exists a set of sustainable solutions where the spouse
who decides rst increases or decreases his/her provision of the family good,
depending on the discount factor. Thus, situations in which the husband
devotes much less time to the family good than does the wife can be possible
sustainable agreements, even without di¤erences in the salaries of the spouses,
as a result of a high discount factor.
The discount factor also reects the subjective probability that the game
will end. The higher the discount factor, the lower the probability that the
game will end in the near future. Even when there is a possibility that the
game will end sometime in the future, as in the case of intertemporal agree-
ments within the family, subject to renegotiation resulting from increases in
potential earnings, our optimum provision of the family good can support a
near-e¢ cient outcome, as long as each spouse believes, with a high enough
probability, that the game will continue. Thus, it is possible to make agree-
ments in a dynamic setting with a nite horizon (see Espinosa and Rhee,
1989).
Knowing the evolution of the paths of the provision of the family good, we
can deduce the inuence of the discount factor on the level of utility derived
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from the cooperation.
Corollary:
For  < e :
In the bargaining solution, a variation of the discount factor can increase
or reduce the levels of utility for both spouses: dU1d 7 0;
dU2
d 7 0:
Proof.(See appendix).
Specically, we observe that, for q1 > bq1;when the discount factor in-
creases, the provision of the family good by the leader decreases, gener-
ating opposite e¤ects on the level of utility of the spouses. The level of
utility increases for the leader and decreases for the follower. By contrast,
for q1 < q1  bq1;when the discount factor increases, the provision of the
family good by the leader increases, and the levels of utility can increase or
decrease for both spouses.
IV Conclusions
Family bargaining models have usually presented the household allocation
problem in a static setting. However, households endure for more than a
single period, and it is necessary to view bargaining in a multi-period context
which can potentially substantially a¤ect the solution.
In this context, we have set up a supergame in an intrahousehold frame-
work, in which both spouses may contribute voluntarily to the provision of
a family good. Assuming that the status quo is not only dened as non-
cooperative, but also as sequential (equilibrium of Stackelberg), and that the
e¢ cient allocation is given by way of the symmetric Nash bargaining solution,
we deduce the inuence of the valuation of the present on the time that each
individual devotes to the provision of the household good, and its e¤ects on
the gains of well-being derived from bargaining.
The following conclusions are obtained. Firstly, the set of possible sustain-
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able agreements derived from bargaining is greater when the discount factor
of the spouse who decides second is higher.
Secondly, the contribution of the follower to the family good is increasing
with respect to the discount factor, whereas the relationship between the
discount factor and the contribution made by the leader is ambiguous.
Thirdly, the gains of well-being derived from the bargaining show an am-
biguous relationship to the discount factor. The e¤ect of the discount factor
will be positive or negative for both spouses, depending on the increase in
the time devoted by the leader to the production of the family good in the
bargaining solution.
These ndings seem to contradict the one-period non-unitary household
approach, but they do conrm previous empirical analyses, in the sense that
the womans contributions to housework may increase, if she decides second,
despite the absence of di¤erences in the opportunity cost of work for both
spouses.
Notes
1Some examples are Aura (2002), Basu (2006), Browning (2000), Lundberg and Pollak
(2003), Lundberg et al. (2003), Mazzocco (2007), Wells and Maher (1998).
2Using methodologies very similar to ours, some studies have examined the relationship
between a union and a rm by developing a supergame with a threat to return to a non-
cooperative Stackelberg equilibrium (Espinosa and Rhee, 1989; De la Rica and Espinosa,
1997).
3Following Vagstad (2001), an average woman about to be married is much better skilled
to keep and maintain a house than her coming husband, and this di¤erence is found for a
broad range of housekeeping activities. There are skills that rarely are acquired through
formal educational, but rather passed on from parents to children or acquired by self studies.
Often, skill acquisition, choice of education and many other decisions in life do not reect
rational decision-making but can be seen as responses to some social norms.
4This argument is similar to the doing gender hypothesis proposed by the sociological
literature to explain the same empirical regularity in a variety of countries (see, among
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others, Bittman et al. (2001) for the Australian case and Brines (1994) for the U.S).
5 It is interesting to note that, under the preferences specied above, the reaction func-
tions for both spouses have null slope, and thus, the provision of the family good by both
agents is strategically independent. As a consequence, the levels of consumption and the
provision of the family good obtained in the Stackelberg equilibrium coincide with those
obtained in a Nash equilibrium.
6This result di¤ers from that obtained by Bucholz et al. (1997). However, it is important
to note that, in our model, the type of Stackelberg equilibrium does not depend on the
aggregate income of the spouses nor on the redistribution of income between spouses. This
is due to the fact that the incomes of the agents are endogenously determined, and that one
spouse cannot compensate the other spouse.
7This is not applicable to the situation of the standard case of Nash reversion, since,
in this situation, decisions are taken simultaneously, and to obtain stationary paths it is
necessary to include an additional inequality similar to that introduced for spouse 2, (10),
but in this case it must also be established for spouse 1 .
8This solution implicitly assumes a bargaining process which results in the generalised
bargaining solution (see Binmore et al. 1986; Harsanyi, 1977).
9 It is straightforward deduce that under the structure of preferences used in this analysis,
the provision of the family good is independent of the discount factor when we use the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium as the threat point in the analysis.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition
To be able to characterize the solution of the maximization problem pro-
pose in (12), we introduce the following assumptions:
We suppose that J(x1; x2; q1; q2) is strictly concave.
The level curves of J(x1; x2; q1; q2) are monotone, in that way:
@ (J1=J2)
@q1
< 0 (13)
For q1 > 0; q2 > 0; the rst order conditions are:
J1 + g1 = 0
J2 + g2 = 0
g(q1; q2; ) = 0
Being  > 0 the multiplier of the problem of maximization. From that it
is possible to deduce the following equation:
J1
J2
=
g1
g2
(14)
Di¤erentiating with respect to , we obtain that:
(J11 + g11)
dq1
d + (J12 + g12)
dq2
d + g1
d
d =  g1
(J21 + g21)
dq1
d + (J22 + g22)
dq2
d + g2
d
d =  g2
g1
dq1
d + g2
dq2
d =  g
These equations can be written in matrix form as:0@(J11 + g11) (J12 + g12) g1(J21 + g21) (J22 + g22) g2
g1 g2 0
1A0@ dq1ddq2
d
d
d
1A =
0@ g1 g2
 g
1A
The matrix on the left hand side is the bordered Hessian. Applying the
Cramers rule it is possible to obtain the changes in q2 when  change:
dq2
d
=
1
jDj

(J11 + g11) g1 g1
(J21 + g21) g2 g2
g1  g 0
 (15)
Where jDj is the determinant of the bordered Hessian. The second order
conditions of the maximization problem require that jDj be positive.
Therefore, the sigh of dq2d is determined by the sign of (15):
sign

dq2
d

= sign
 (1  w2   q 12 ) + (q1   q1)(J11  1  w2   q 12   J12)
(16)
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Given that (1  w2   q 12 ) < 0 ^ q2 > q2; and under (13) and (14), we
deduce that (16) is positive: dq2d > 0:
Di¤erentiating the restriction with respect to , we have:
dq1
d
=  1


(q1   q1) + (1  w2   q 12 )
dq2
d

(17)
Thus, the sign of dq1d is the sign of the numerator:
sign

dq1
d

= sign

 (q1   q1)  (1  w2   q 12 )
dq2
d

Given that (q1   q1) > 0; (1  w2   q 12 ) < 0 ^ dq2d > 0;we deduce that
dq1
d 7 0:
From (15) and (17), we can determine a value q^1 , with q^1 > q1; which
represents the minimum value from which the relationship between the dis-
count factor and the level of provision of the family good made by this agent
becomes negative. So, when q1 > q^1, we obtain that
dq1
d < 0 and when
q^1  q1 > q1 what we obtain is that dq1d > 0:
Proof of Corollary
Applying the envelope theorem, we derive the utility function of both
spouses (1) with respect to  :
For the spouse 1, we obtain:
dU1
d
=
@U1
@q1
dq1
d
+
@U1
@q2
dq2
d
(18)
Taking into account (17), this expression takes the following form:
dU1
d
=
 (1  w1   q 11 ) (q1   q1)

+
"
1  (1  w1   q
 1
1 )(1  w2   q 12 )

#
dq2
d
(19)
Given that (1 w1 q 11 ) < 0, (1 w2 q 12 ) < 0; dq2d > 0; (q1   q1) >
0; 0 <  < 1; 0 < qi < 1 (i = 1; 2);we deduce that:
dU1
d 7 0:
Analogously, we have that:
dU1
d = (1  w1   q 11 )dq1d + dq2d 7 0:
Given that dq2d > 0 and with
dq1
d < 0, we obtain that
dU1
d > 0 with q1 > q^1.
When dq1d > 0, we obtain that
dU1
d < 0 with q^1  q1 > q1.
For the spouse 2,
dU2
d =
@U2
@q1
dq1
d +
@U2
@q2
dq2
d
Introducing (17), we deduce that:
21
dU2
d =
 
1  1

(1  w2   q 12 )dq2d  
(q1 q1)
 7 0:
Analogously, we obtain that
dU2
d = (1  w2   q 12 )dq2d + dq1d 7 0:
Given that dq2d > 0 and with
dq1
d < 0, we obtain that
dU2
d < 0: Remember
that it is necessary that q1 > q^1 to obtain a negative relationship between
the discount factor and the level of provision of the family good made by the
spouse 1. When dq1d > 0, we obtain that
dU2
d > 0; with q^1  q1 > q1.
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                               Figure 1. Set of Pareto-Superior Solutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Set of possible sustainable bargaining solutions 
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